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To increase dramatically the distance and the secure key generation rate of quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD), the idea of quantum decoys—signals of different intensities—has recently been
proposed. Here, we present the first experimental implementation of decoy state QKD. By making
simple modifications to a commercial quantum key distribution system, we show that a secure key
generation rate of 165bit/s, which is 1/4 of the theoretical limit, can be obtained over 15km of a
Telecom fiber. We also show that with the same experimental parameters, not even a single bit of
secure key can be extracted with a non-decoy-state protocol. Compared to building single photon
sources, decoy state QKD is a much simpler method for increasing the distance and key generation
rate of unconditionally secure QKD.
PACS numbers:
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] was proposed
as a method of achieving perfectly secure communica-
tions. Any eavesdropping attempt by a third party will
necessarily introduce an abnormally high quantum bit
error rate in a quantum transmission and thus be caught
by the users. With a perfect single photon source, QKD
provides proven unconditional security guaranteed by the
fundamental laws of quantum physics [3, 4].
Most current experimental QKD set-ups are based on
attenuated laser pulses which occasionally give out multi-
photons. Therefore, any security proofs must take into
account the possibility of subtle eavesdropping attacks,
including the PNS (photon number splitting) attack [5].
A hallmark of those subtle attacks is that they introduce
a photon-number dependent attenuation to the signal.
Fortunately, it is still possible to obtain uncondition-
ally secure QKD, even with (phase randomized) attenu-
ated laser pulses, as theoretically demonstrated by [6] and
Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) [7]. How-
ever, one must pay a steep price by placing severe limits
on the distance and the key generation rate. See also [8].
A key question is this: how can one extend the dis-
tance and key generation rate of secure QKD? A brute
force solution to this problem would be to use a (nearly)
perfect single photon source. Despite much experimental
effort [9], reliable perfect single photon sources are far
from practical.
Another solution to increase the transmission distance
and key generation rate is to employ decoy states, using
extra states of different average photon number to detect
photon-number dependent attenuation. It has attracted
great recent interests. The decoy method was first dis-
covered by Hwang [10]. In [11], we presented the first rig-
orous security proof of decoy state QKD. We showed that
the decoy state method can be combined with standard
GLLP result to achieve dramatically higher key genera-
tion rates and distances. Moreover, we proposed practi-
cal protocols with vacua or weak coherent states as de-
coys. Subsequently, the security of practical protocols
have been analyzed by Wang [12] and us [13]. See also
[14]. In particular, we [13] demonstrated theoretically
the clear practicality of decoy state QKD using only one
decoy state. We call such a protocol a one-decoy proto-
col.
However, until now, all decoy state QKD papers [10,
11, 12, 13, 14] have been theoretical and there has been
no experimental demonstration. Here, we present, for
the first time, an experimental realization of decoy state
QKD.
We remark that additional errors will appear in exper-
imental implementation of a decoy state protocol. An
example of a source of additional errors is intensity mod-
ulation, which, as will be discussed below, is required
for the implementation of decoy state QKD. Those ad-
ditional errors will change the parameters and, thus, the
quantitative results in the simulations done in previous
papers [11, 12, 13]. Therefore, to quantify the advantage
of decoy state QKD in practice, it is crucial to perform
a real experiment and analyze the data obtained experi-
mentally.
In our experiment, we use acousto-optic modulators
(AOM) to achieve polarization insensitive modulation,
which is important for our set-up. While already used
in telecommunications, we believe that this is the first
time that AOMs have been introduced in a QKD exper-
iment. In summary, our experiment demonstrates a new
approach—decoy state QKD—with a new experimental
component—AOM—in QKD.
We will first discuss the GLLP result and how the de-
coy state method can be combined with GLLP to achieve
high key generation rate and distance. The GLLP [7]
method can be used to prove the security of QKD based
on a phase randomized weak coherent state source. With
the GLLP method the secure key generation rate, which
is defined as the ratio of the length of the secure key to
the total number of signals sent by Alice, is given by [11]
R ≥ q{−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q1[1−H2(e1)]}, (1)
2where q depends on the protocol [15], the subscript µ is
the average photon number per signal in signal states,
Qµ is the gain [16] of signal states, Eµ is the quantum
bit error rate (QBER) of signal states, Q1 is the gain of
the single photon states (i.e., the probability that Alice
generates exactly a single photon which is finally detected
by Bob) in signal states, e1 is the error rate of single
photon states in signal states. f(x) is the bi-directional
error correction rate [17], andH2(x) is the binary entropy
function: H2(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x). Qµ
and Eµ can both be measured directly from experiments,
while Q1 and e1 have to be estimated (because we could
not measure the photon number of each pulse).
Owing to the loss in a fiber, its length determines the
gains and QBERs (as denoted by Qµ, Q1, Eµ, e1) and
therefore, the key generation rate R. At the distance
where the key generation rate R hits zero, the QKD
protocol is no longer secure (with the standard classical
post-processing protocol which uses only one-way classi-
cal communications).
Clearly, to estimate key generation rate, the main task
is to estimate a lower bound of Q1 and an upper bound
of e1. However, in non-decoy state approaches, the es-
timations are quite poor. This is the reason why, with
non-decoy state approaches, QKD can be proven to be
secure only at very limited key generation rate and dis-
tance. While experimental QKD has been demonstrated
at 122km in telecom fibers [18], most of the previous
experiments do not appear to satisfy the strict secu-
rity analysis demanded in non-decoy approaches [7, 19].
Given that security is the most crucial issue in QKD, this
is a highly unsatisfactory situation.
Fortunately, decoy state QKD comes to the rescue. As
discussed below, decoy state QKD allows dramatic im-
provement in our estimations of Q1 and e1, compared
to non-decoy approaches. The basic idea of decoy state
QKD is as follows: in addition to the signal state with
average photon number µ, one introduces some “decoy”
states with some other average photon numbers νi and
blends signal states with decoy states randomly on Alice’s
side [20]. For instance, in a one-decoy state protocol [13],
the average photon number of a decoy state is much lower
than that of the signal state. After Bob’s acknowledge-
ment of receipt of signals, Alice broadcasts which pulses
are signal states and which are decoy states. Alice and
Bob can, therefore, analyze the statistical characteristics
(i.e., transmittance and QBER) of each type of signal
separately. Since one assumes all characteristics (except
photon number distribution) of the signal state and the
decoy state are the same, Eve’s eavesdropping attack can
depend on the actual photon number in each pulse, but
she has no knowledge which state (signal or decoy) the
pulse is in. Eve’s attack will modify the characteristics
(transmittance or QBER) of decoy states and/or signal
states and will be caught. For instance, in a one-decoy
state protocol, if Eve introduces a photon-number de-
pendent attenuation to the channel, then the transmit-
tance of the decoy state (which has a much lower average
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FIG. 1: Schematic of the experimental set-up in our system.
Inside Bob/Jr. Alice: components in Bob/Alice’s package of
id Quantique QKD system. Our modifications: CA: Com-
pensating AOM; CG: Compensating Generator; DA: Decoy
AOM; DG: Decoy Generator. Original QKD system: LD:
laser diode; APD: avalanche photon diode; Φi: phase mod-
ulator; PBS: polarization beam splitter; PD: classical photo
detector; DL: Delay line; FM: faraday mirror. Solid line:
SMF28 single mode optical fiber; dashed line: electric cable.
photon number than the signal state) will generally be
much lower than what Alice and Bob would expect un-
der normal operations. Note that decoy states are used
only for catching an eavesdropper, but not for key gen-
eration. It has been shown [11, 12, 13] that, in theory,
decoy state QKD can substantially enhance security and
performance of QKD.
Before describing our experiment, we would like to
point out that if one already had a uni-directional QKD
system [18, 21] in place, the implementation of decoy
state QKD would have been much easier: one can simply
drive the laser source directly to various power levels.
Modified “Plug and Play” set-up: Unfortunately, most
existing commercial QKD systems are bi-directional
(“Plug & Play”) in the sense that Bob sends out a chain
of strong signals to Alice, who attenuates each signal to
single photon level and modulates (i.e., encodes quantum
information on) it before sending it back to Bob, who per-
forms the measurement (i.e., decoding of quantum infor-
mation), after which a new chain of strong signals will
be sent to Alice. Therefore, the intensity modulation by
Alice has to be carefully synchronized with Bob’s laser
source.
Here, we show that, even with such a commercial sys-
tem (manufactured by id Quantique in our current set-
up), one can successfully implement decoy state QKD by
making simple modifications.
Our Experiment: FIG. 1 illustrates the schematic of
our system. The commercial QKD system consists of
Bob and Jr. Alice. In our experiment, Alice consists of
Jr. Alice and four new optical and electric components:
an AOM (DA in FIG. 1), a function generator (DG in
FIG. 1), a compensating AOM (CA in FIG. 1) and a
compensating generator (CG in FIG. 1). Their functions
will be discussed below.
We implement the one decoy state protocol proposed
by our group in [13] on top of the standard BB84 [1] pro-
tocol. In a one decoy state protocol, Alice must randomly
modulate the intensity of each signal to either signal state
level or decoy state level before sending it back to Bob.
3We add an AOM (DA in FIG. 1) on Alice’s side. A func-
tion generator (DG in FIG. 1) controls the transmittance
of the AOM.
A critical issue in our set-up is to compensate the phase
shift due to our AOM. Since the Mach-Zehnder Interfer-
ometer (MZI) on Bob’s side is asymmetric, the frequency
shift introduced by AOM causes a significant phase shift
between the two pulses that go through different arms of
MZI. To compensate this phase shift, another AOM, the
“Compensating AOM” (CA in FIG. 1) is employed to
make the total phase shift multiples of 2pi. This AOM is
driven by the second function generator, “Compensating
Generator” (CG in FIG. 1) [22].
Optimization of Parameters: We perform a numerical
simulation [13] with parameters of our set-up [23] and
optimally set µ and ν to 0.80 and 0.12 photons respec-
tively. The actual distribution of the states is produced
by an id Quantique Quantum Random Number Gener-
ator. Around 10% of the signals are assigned as decoy
states, which is optimal according to numerical simula-
tion [13]. This random pattern is generated and loaded
to the Decoy Generator before the experiment [24].
Except for the modulation period, the transmittance
of Decoy AOM (DA) is set to maximum. As the classi-
cal detector (PD in FIG. 1) inside Alice detects the first
pulse from Bob, it triggers the Decoy Generator (DG).
The Decoy Generator (DG) will then hold a delay time
td before outputting the random pattern to modulate dif-
ferent states. The Compensating AOM (CA) is used only
for the purpose of phase compensation. Thus, its trans-
mittance is set to be constant.
Recall that each signal in a “Plug and Play” set up
consists of two time-separated pulses. To keep visibility
high, the two pulses of the same signal must be attenu-
ated equally, which means the delay time must be very
precise. In our experiment, the delay time td was deter-
mined with an accuracy of 10ns.
In our experiment, a total of N = 105M raw bits (in-
cluding both signal states and decoy states) were sent
using quantum key distribution from Alice to Bob. The
transmitting time was less than four minutes.
After the transmission of all the N signals, Bob an-
nounced which signals had actually been received by him
and in which basis. Alice broadcasted to Bob the distri-
bution of decoy states as well as basis information. We
assume Alice and Bob announced the measurement out-
comes of all decoy states as well as a subset of the signal
states. From those experimental data, Alice and Bob
then determined Qµ, Qν Eµ, and Eν , whose values are
now listed in Table I.
Analysis of Experimental Results: Alice and Bob have
to derive a lower bound on the key generation rate, R, by
applying the theory of one decoy state protocol to their
experimental data. To begin, we discuss the theory of
one decoy state protocol. The one-decoy state protocol
was first proposed in [11] and analyzed in [13]. In such a
protocol, only one decoy state is used (in principle, more
decoy states might increase key generation rate) whose
average photon number is ν. The transmittance/gain of
the decoy state Qν and its error rate Eν could also be
acquired directly from experiments. Taking statistical
fluctuations into account, the lower bound of Q1, and
the upper bound of e1 are given by [13]
Q1 ≥ QL1 =
µ2e−µ
µν − ν2 (Q
L
ν e
ν −Qµeµ ν
2
µ2
− EµQµeµµ
2 − ν2
e0µ2
)
e1 ≤ eU1 =
EµQµ
QL
1
,
(2)
in which
QLν = Qν(1−
uα√
NνQν
), (3)
where Nν is the number of pulses used as decoy states
[25], and e0 (=1/2) is the error rate for the vacuum signal
and therefore the lower bound of key generation rate is
R ≥ RL = q{−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +QL1 [1−H2(eU1 )]} (4)
In our analysis of experimental data, we estimated e1
and Q1 very conservatively as within 10 standard devia-
tions (i.e., uα=10), which promises a confidence interval
for statistical fluctuations of 1− 1.5× 10−23.
The experimental results listed in Table I are the in-
puts for Eqs. (2-4), whose output is a lower bound of
the key generation rate, as shown in Table II. Even with
our very conservative estimation of e1 and Q1, we got a
lower bound for the key generation rate RL = 3.6× 10−4
per pulse, or 165bits/s, which means a final key length
of about L = NR ≃ 38kbit. We also calculated Rperfect,
the theoretical limit from the case of infinite data size
and infinite decoy states protocol, by using Eq. (1). We
remark that our lower bound RL is indeed good because
it is roughly 1/4 of Rperfect. This fact suggests that it
is not necessary, or rather, not economical to use either
a very large quantity of data or a lot of different decoy
states.
Based on the method described in [7, 11, 13], we care-
fully performed numerical simulations with [23]. We
found that without decoy method, no matter what value
of µ we choose or how large the data size we use, the
key generation rate, R, will hit zero at only 9.6km. In
other words, at 15km, not even a single bit could be
shared between Alice and Bob with guaranteed security.
In contrast, our numerical simulations show that, with
decoy states, our QKD set-up can be made secure over
Para. Value Para. Value Para. Value
Qµ 8.757 × 10
−3 Eµ 9.536 × 10
−3 q 0.4478
Qν 1.360 × 10
−3 Eν 2.689 × 10
−2 f(Eµ) [17] ≤1.22
TABLE I: Experimental data and some parameters we used in
our experiment. As required by GLLP [7], bit values for dou-
ble detections are assigned randomly by the quantum random
number generator.
450km, which is substantially larger than the secure dis-
tance (9.6km) without decoy states.
In summary, we have performed the first experimental
demonstration of decoy state QKD, over 15km of Tele-
com fibers. Our experiment shows that, with rather sim-
ple modifications (by adding commercial acousto-optic
modulators, AOM) to a commercial QKD system, decoy
method allows us to achieve much better performance
with substantially higher key generation rate and longer
distance than is otherwise possible. We conclude that,
with careful conceptual design and optimization, decoy
state QKD is easy to implement in experiments. It is,
therefore, ready for immediate commercial applications.
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Para. Value Para. Value
QL1 2.140 × 10
−3 RL 3.588 × 10−4
eU1 3.902 × 10
−2 Rperfect 1.418 × 10
−3
TABLE II: The lower bounds of Q1, R and the upper bound of
e1. The values are calculated from Eqs. (2-4). As a compari-
son, we also gave the theoretical limit, Rperfect. It represents
the situation of infinitely long data size and infinitely many
decoy states. Our result shows that even a simple one decoy
state protocol can achieve one fourth of the theoretical limit.
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